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We study alternative market power mitigation measures in a model where a dominant producer 
faces a competitive fringe with the same cost structure. We characterise the asset divestment by 
the dominant firm which achieves the greatest reduction in prices. This divestment entails the 
sale of marginal assets whose cost range encompasses the post-divestment price. A divestment 
of this type can be several times more effective in reducing prices than divestments of baseload 
(or low-cost) assets. We also establish that financial contracts (modeled as Virtual Power Plant 
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1 Introduction  
 
Regulatory and antitrust proceedings often require the application of remedies, in order to 
mitigate the market power of the affected parties or prevent a reduction in competition 
from a change in market structure. The appropriate remedy design often plays a critical 
role in ensuring that competition remains effective in the presence of firms with market 
power. This paper studies the issue of optimal remedy design in a stylised model that is 
designed to capture the essential features of the wholesale electricity market. Our analysis 
focuses on the relative impact of different types of asset divestments, and on the 
comparison between divestments and financial contracts (in the form of Virtual Power 
Plants (VPP)). Our framework and results are however applicable also to industries which 
share some of the basic features of power generation (most notably, a homogenous final 
product and cost asymmetries between different assets). 
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they are affiliated. In electricity generation markets, the divestment of actual and/or virtual capacity owned by
producers with market power is often employed as a remedy by competition authorities and sec-
tor regulators to enhance competition. Outright plant divestments and VPP schemes have been
used across Europe in recent times, in the context of merger control proceedings, abuse of domi-
nance investigations, and regulatory reviews of market power in electricity markets. Examples of
mergers or joint ventures in the electricity sector where divestments or VPPs have been required
by the competition authorities include Gas Natural/Union Fenosa (2009), EDF/British Energy
(2008), Gas Natural/Endesa (2006), GDF/Suez (2006), Nuon/Reliant (2003), ESB/Statoil (2002)
and EDF/EnBW (2000).1 Alleged abuse of dominance cases where divestments or VPPs have
been implemented as a remedy include proceedings involving E.On (2008), RWE (2008) and Enel
(2006). Divestment of generation capacity have also been used by regulators to mitigate market
power of incumbent generators in the UK and Italy in the 1990s, whilst in Spain and Portugal
regulatory contracts and more recently VPPs have been employed to make the electricity market
more competitive.
This paper analyses the competitive impact of divestments and of VPPs in a stylised model of
a wholesale electricity market where a dominant producer faces a competitive fringe with the same
cost structure. The aim of the paper is two-fold: to study the diﬀerential impact of divestments
depending on the costs of the generation capacity that is sold by the dominant ﬁrm (and thereby
identify the divestment policy which achieves the largest reduction in prices); and to compare the
eﬀectiveness of divestments of generation capacity with that of VPPs.
We ﬁnd that the position of the divested capacity on the marginal cost curve of the dominant
ﬁrm has a strong eﬀect on the impact that a divestment has on market prices. For suﬃciently large
divestments, the divestment policy which achieves the greatest reduction in prices is the one which
divests marginal plants, whose range of costs encompasses the post-divestment equilibrium price
(at a given demand level). A divestment of this type induces the dominant ﬁrm to price on the
ﬂatter segment of its residual demand curve. Depending on the size of the divestment, the most
eﬀective divestment can reduce prices several times more than the divestment of baseload plants
and it can lead to competitive pricing. We also ﬁnd that the optimal divestment always increases
total welfare (or eﬃciency), whilst this is not the case for all types of divestments. Our results on
divestments have implications for the assessment of the impact of independent entry, showing that
the entry of marginal plants can be signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in reducing prices than the entry of
baseload plants.
The paper compares the optimal divestment policy to VPP arrangements. We abstract in our
modelling from some of the potential advantages of VPPs, including the fact that they may be easier
and faster to implement than plant divestments, and can be reversed once competitive conditions
improve. We also do not model some of the shortcomings of VPPs which have been identiﬁed in
d y n a m i cs e t t i n g s( e . g .t h ef a c tt h a tt h e ym a yn o tm i t i g a t em a r k e tp o w e re ﬀectively if VPP auctions
1Divestments of generation capacity were also implemented in the British market in the context of two mergers
involving the incumbent generators and retail suppliers during the 1990s.
2are repeated over time, thereby potentially giving incentives to producers with market power to
increase spot prices to aﬀect future VPP revenues).
We model VPPs as a set of several call options on the output of the dominant ﬁrm with diﬀerent
exercise prices. We establish that VPPs are always weakly less eﬀective than plant divestments in
reducing prices and they can at best replicate the impact of a baseload divestment (if the strike
prices are set suﬃciently low, implying that the VPP works like a forward contract). This result
implies that setting the strike prices of a VPP so as to mimic the variable costs of marginal plants
does not increase the eﬀectiveness of the remedy. In particular, it does not ensure that the sale of
virtual plants will be as eﬀective as the corresponding divestment of generating capacity in reducing
prices.
There is a relatively limited literature on the impact of divestments and VPPs on market power
in electricity generation markets, and on their relative eﬀectiveness. Most of the related academic
research to date has focused on the impact of forward contracts on market power. This literature is
relevant to VPPs since forward contracts can be interpreted as call options which are exercised by
the option holder independently of the spot price (i.e. the options are always “in the money”). This
strand of the literature was started by the contribution by Allaz and Vila (1993), which established
that forward contracts can signiﬁcantly increase competition in spot markets in a Cournot duopoly
model. Newbery (1998), Green (1999), and Bushnell (2007) extend some of the results established
by Allaz and Vila to competition in supply functions and Cournot competition with multiple ﬁrms,
in the speciﬁc context of electricity markets.
More recently some papers have noted that the pro-competitive impact of forward contracts
in electricity markets may be mitigated in the presence of repeated interaction with or without
asymmetric information on the costs of the dominant ﬁrms (see Schultz, 2007, and Zhang and
Zwart, 2006 respectively), or if contracts are not assigned to the largest ﬁrms in the market, in a
model with discrete bidding functions (Fabra and de Frutos, 2008). Our paper shows that even
in the absence of these circumstances, contracts and/or VPPs are inferior to divestments as an
instrument to increase competition in electricity markets.
Willems (2006) is more closely related to our paper. Willems compares the eﬀectiveness of
“ﬁnancial” and “physical” VPPs, where the latter are deﬁned as options for capacity that are
directly bid in the market by the option holder (whilst ﬁnancial VPPs are simply call options which
a r es e t t l e do n c et h es p o tm a r k e tc l e a r s ) .H eﬁnds that the market is more competitive with physical
rather than ﬁnancial options, due to the assumed impact of physical options on the conjectures
made by strategic players. The eﬀect identiﬁed by Willems is not present in our framework, since
physical and ﬁnancial options are equivalent in the absence of strategic interaction (which is the
case for the residual monopoly setting with a competitive fringe that we adopt). Nonetheless we
ﬁnd that − even in a residual monopoly framework − divestments and VPPs can have a very
diﬀerent impact on market prices, due to the fact that divestments have diﬀerent properties than
physical options and can be signiﬁcantly more pro-competitive than option contracts.
More generally, the results presented in this paper are related to some of the points noted by
Armington et al. (2006) and Wolak and McRae (2008). These two articles discuss in qualitative
3terms how divestments of generation capacity can be utilised to remedy the expected impact of a
merger on prices, using the speciﬁce x a m p l eo ft h ep r o p o s e dE x e l o n / P S E Gm e r g e ri nt h eU Si n
2006. The remedies imposed by the US Department of Justice in that merger focused on divesting
‘ability’ assets, whose costs were close to the market clearing price, implying that the merged
entity faced a low opportunity cost of withholding them from the market. By divesting these
plants, the competition authority sought to reduce the incentives of the merging parties to increase
prices. The results presented in our paper formalise and extend this intuition, identifying exactly
which plants should be divested to maximise the pro-competitive impact of the remedy (for a given
demand level). Our results also provide formal support to the relatively commonly-held view in
the literature and decision practice on electricity markets that ownership of price-setting assets
confers greater market power than ownership of baseload plants, even though both types of assets
contribute to the presence of market power (for a discussion see Newbery, 2005, and Federico et al.
2008; see also OECD, 2005 for some related results).
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the set-up of
our model, including a characterisation of the residual monopoly (or pre-divestment) equilibrium.
Section 3 solves the case of divestments of intermediate size (which we treat as our benchmark
divestment scenario). Section 4 presents our results for VPPs, comparing them to those obtained
for intermediate divestments. Section 5 extends our core results to the cases of small and large
divestments, whilst Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l s e t - u p
We model a market with a dominant electricity ﬁrm facing a competitive fringe that oﬀers all of its
output at cost.2 We also assume for simplicity that pre-divestment the dominant ﬁrm and the fringe
have the same linear and increasing marginal cost function, with slope γ.The marginal cost function
can be interpreted as the aggregation of production from several atomistic generation plants with
diﬀerent marginal costs, stacked in ‘merit order’, from the cheapest to the most expensive. We
deﬁne marginal costs for each ﬁrm i as ci and output as qi. We also adopt subscript d for the
dominant ﬁrm and f for the fringe. Our set-up implies that ci = γqi for i = d,f.
We also assume that total demand is perfectly price inelastic and takes a value of μ. We assume
a constant willingness to pay for consumers that lies above the pre-divestment equilibrium price.
This ensures that total and consumer surplus are ﬁnite. The assumption of inelastic demand also
implies that consumer welfare decreases monotonically with the market price, and that total welfare
increases if total production costs decrease.
2Whilst this set-up is stylised, it is also a reasonable representation of the competitive structure of a number
of European power markets, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Our set-up is also directly
applicable to the competitive residual demand framework recently proposed by Gilbert and Newbery (2008) for the
evaluation of mergers in the electricity sector.
42.1 Pre-divestment equilibrium
For a given price p, the competitive fringe always produce at its marginal cost: p = cf = γqf,w h e r e
qf = μ − qd,i m p l y i n gt h a tp = γ(μ − qd).
The dominant ﬁrm solves maxp pqd−
R
cddq, which is equivalent to solving maxqd γ(μ−qd)qd−









where the latter deﬁnes the residual monopoly (or pre-divestment) price level.
In the pre-divestment equilibrium the dominant ﬁrm therefore serves a third of demand, rather





withheld from the market, forcing more expensive generation units owned by the fringe to produce,
thereby raising prices and lowering both consumer and total welfare. Note that the competitive
price (i.e. the price which would result if all production plants in the market were oﬀered at their
marginal cost) is given by pc = 1
2γμ.
2.2 Deﬁnition of divestment
We model divestments of generation units that are located contiguously on the marginal cost
function of the dominant ﬁrm. The maximum output (or capacity) that can be produced by the
d i v e s t e du n i t si sd e ﬁned as δ. This parameter describes the ‘size’ of the divestment. The marginal
cost of the most expensive divested unit is deﬁned as c. This uniquely deﬁnes the ‘position’ of
the divestment on the cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm. The marginal cost of the least expensive
divested unit is therefore given by c = c−γδ. For notational purposes we also deﬁne q0 as follows:
q0 = c
γ.4
Divested generation units are assigned to the competitive fringe and are therefore oﬀered to
the market at cost in the post-divestment equilibrium. Relative to the pre-divestment set-up, post-
divestment the marginal cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm shifts upwards for cd > c − γδ and its
residual demand curve is lower for p>c − γδ.I ti sa l s oﬂatter than the pre-divestment residual
demand function for p ∈ (c − γδ,c),w h i l s tf o rp ≥ c it has the same slope as the pre-divestment
residual demand function, but it is displaced downwards by the size of the divestment δ.T h e
impact of a divestment on the marginal cost and residual demand functions of the dominant ﬁrm
is illustrated in Figure 1.
The rest of this paper focuses on the impact on market prices (and therefore consumer welfare)
of divestments of size δ, depending on their location on the cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm (given
3The second-order conditions are satisﬁed throughout the analysis.
4This variable deﬁnes the total output that the dominant ﬁrm would produce in the pre-divestment set-up if the
unit with marginal cost c were its last (or marginal) unit to be oﬀered to the market and accepted for production.
It can also be interpreted as a quantity index along the cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm, which also describes the
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Figure 1: Description of the model set-up and of the impact of a divestment.
by c). We primarily concentrate on consumer welfare rather than total welfare in our assessment
of divestments given that competition authorities and sector regulators are typically concerned
with policies which beneﬁt consumers. We however also comment on the welfare implications of
alternative divestment policies.
We rely on this set-up to model also the impact on prices of VPPs. VPPs are analysed as call
options that are structured so as to mimic a given plant divestment. That is, we consider a bundle
of call options of total size δ with contiguous strike prices ranging from c to c−γδ. This modelling
assumption is set out in more detail in Section 4 below.
3 Divestments of intermediate size
In this section of the paper we model divestments of intermediate size, deﬁned as cases where δ,
expressed as a ratio of total demand μ (i.e. δ
μ), lies between 1 − 12
5
√
6 ≈ 0.02 and 1 − 2 √
6 ≈ 0.18.
This is a relative wide range for the divestment, which we feel captures most realistic scenarios.5
In Section 5 below we extend our results also to cases with smaller and larger divestments.
5For example, in the case of the Spanish wholesale electricity market which had average demand in 2007 of
approximately 30GW, the range for the divestments that we consider here is between 0.6GW and 5.5GW (evaluated
at average demand). As a comparison, the total size of the VPP imposed on the two largest producers (Endesa
and Iberdrola) in 2008 and 2009 reached roughly 2.5GW, and that of the plant divestments ordered by the Spanish
government in two recent domestic mergers (the proposed merger between Gas Natural andE n d e s a ,a n dt h ea p p r o v e d
merger between Gas Natural and Union Fenosa) were of 4.2GW and 2 GW respectively (see Federico et al. 2008).
Another example of divestments is provided by the merger between EDF and British Energy in the British market,
where the European Commission imposed a divestment of 2.8GW of generation capacity in December 2008. This is
equivalent to roughly 0.07 of average electricity demand in Great Britain, which is also within the range of intermediate
divestments that we consider.
63.1 Prices with divestments of intermediate size
The following Proposition describes the post-divestment price function for divestments of inter-
mediate size, as a function of the position of the divested plants. As we show, a unique optimal
divestment can be identiﬁed. The optimal divestment is deﬁned as the one that leads to the lowest
price (and therefore the highest level of consumer welfare) in the post-divestment equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Intermediate divestments) The post-divestment price function depends on the
position of the plant divestment (denoted by c). This function (deﬁned as p(c)) has 6 distinct
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(μ − δ), which deﬁnes the lower
bound of segment IV of the post-divestment price function. The optimal divestment achieves the
competitive price pc at the upper end of the range for the size of the divestment considered in this
Proposition (i.e. if δ
μ =1− 2 √
6 ). Otherwise it yields a price that is between pc and p∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The post-divestment price function is shown in Figure 2, as a function of the position of the
divestment c.A s t h e ﬁgure illustrates this function lies below the pre-divestment price p∗ for
divestments that are suﬃciently competitive, which is the case for c suﬃciently low (i.e. c<
p∗ +3 ∆p).
The six segments in the post-divestment price function can be understood by reference to the
impact of a divestment on the cost and demand of the dominant ﬁrm. As we noted above, a
divestment increases the cost function of the dominant ﬁrm above a given marginal cost level
(i.e. for cd > c − γδ). This can be deﬁned as a cost-increasing eﬀect. This eﬀect is relevant
to equilibrium pricing for divestments of production capacity whose marginal cost is suﬃciently
low (implying that the dominant ﬁrm is utilising at least part of the divested capacity in the pre-
divestment equilibrium). Note that the presence of the cost-increasing eﬀect tends to reduce the
pro-competitive impact of a divestment because it induces the dominant ﬁrm to set higher prices,
ceteris paribus, since its costs are higher.
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Figure 2: The post-divestment price as a function of the position of the divestment on the cost
curve of the dominant ﬁrm (for divestments of intermediate size).
A divestment also changes the residual demand curve of the dominant ﬁrm, introducing a ﬂatter
segment, and also displacing it downwards by the size of the divestment δ for suﬃciently high price
levels (i.e. p>c), as it is shown in Figure 1. We term the ﬁrst demand eﬀect a demand-slope
eﬀect, whilst the second demand eﬀect is termed a demand-shift eﬀect.
The four segments of the post-divestment price function where interior equilibria exist (these
a r es e g m e n t sI ,I I I ,I Va n dV I− see Appendix A.1) display diﬀerent combinations of these three
possible cost and demand eﬀects, and diﬀer depending on which of the three eﬀects are relevant to
the conduct of the dominant ﬁrm in the post-divestment equilibrium:
• In segment I (which relates to divestment of low-cost, or baseload, units) the cost-increasing
and the demand-shift eﬀects apply, leading to a price reduction since the second eﬀect out-
weighs the ﬁrst. The eﬀect of the divestment in this segment is equivalent to the imposition
of a forward contract of size δ on the producer, as we show formally in Section 4.
• In segment III, the demand-shift eﬀect applies, but not the cost-increasing one, since the
divested units are relatively expensive and include capacity which the dominant ﬁrm would
have not utilised in the post-divestment equilibrium even if it had been available. The cost of
the divested units is however suﬃciently low for the divested capacity to be fully utilised by
the competitive fringe, which in turn reduces the residual demand faced by the dominant ﬁrm
by δ. The price reduction from the divestment is therefore larger than in segment I (more
precisely, it is twice as large) since the cost-increasing eﬀect is absent.
• In segment IV, the demand-slope eﬀect applies instead of the demand-shift eﬀect since the
8cost of the divested units is suﬃciently high so as to make it proﬁtable for the dominant ﬁrm
to price on the ﬂatter segment of its residual demand curve (rather than withholding more
output, and pricing on the steeper part of the curve). As long as the divestments located
within segment IV are suﬃciently competitive (i.e. for c low enough), pricing on the ﬂatter
part of the demand curve has an output-expansion eﬀect and yields lower prices relative to
segment III of the post-divestment price function.
• In segment VI, none of the three eﬀects identiﬁed above apply, since the divested units have
marginal costs that are too high to constrain the pricing of the dominant ﬁrm. The post-
divestment price is therefore the same as the residual monopoly price p∗.
The other two segments of the post-divestment price function (segments II and V) are corner
solutions (as is also explained in Appendix A.1).
• In segment II the demand-shift eﬀect applies and the dominant ﬁrm produces on the post-
divestment cost function. The cost-increasing eﬀect is present here since the dominant ﬁrm
cannot produce the optimal output implied under segment III because at that output level its
costs would increase relative to the pre-divestment equilibrium. The dominant ﬁrm therefore
selects an output level that is exactly equal to q0 − δ (i.e. the quantity corresponding to the
ﬁrst generation unit that is divested), and does not utilise any of the units that are more
expensive than the divested capacity.
• In segment V the dominant ﬁrm prices on the second kink of its residual demand curve,
i.e. where the ﬂatter segment of the curve intersects the original pre-divestment residual
demand function. The price is therefore equal to the lowest cost of the divested capacity
(i.e. p = c − γδ), implying that none of the divested units produce in the post-divestment
e q u i l i b r i u m .T h i sp r i c ei sb e l o wt h em o n o p o l yp r i c es i n c ea tt h a tp r i c es o m eo ft h ed i v e s t e d
units would be able to produce. In order to avoid the reduction in its demand that would
result if the divested capacity were to produce some output, the dominant ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal
to price on the second kink of its residual demand curve. It therefore increases its output
and lowers its price compared to the pre-divestment outcome, thus ensuring that none of the
divested units produce in the post-divestment equilibrium.
3.2 Characterisation of the optimal divestment of intermediate size
Proposition 1 establishes that the divestment which yields the largest price reduction relative to
the pre-divestment equilibrium is the one given by the lowest-cost divestment on segment IV. This
is the segment where the dominant ﬁrm prices on the ﬂatter part of its residual demand curve.
This optimal position for the divested capacity (deﬁned as c = b c above) results in the lowest post-
divestment price because it induces the dominant ﬁrm to drop its price in order to capture more
output from the competitive fringe, and prevent some of the divested capacity from producing. At
9the optimal divestment, the range of costs of the divested capacity encompasses the post-divestment
price, implying that the divested plants are marginal (or price-setting), and that some of divested
capacity does not produce in equilibrium.
The highest marginal cost of the optimally divested capacity is below the pre-divestment price.6
Moreover, the cost range of the optimal divestment lies above both the costs of the cheapest units
withheld by the dominant ﬁrm in the pre—divestment equilibrium, and the competitive price pc.7 If
one thinks as the cheapest withheld units as the marginal, or price-setting units, of the dominant
ﬁrm in the pre-divestment equilibrium (e.g. as would be the case if the dominant producer was
constrained to oﬀer a linear supply function for its output), this condition implies that the optimal
divestment needs to include units which are bid above the pre-divestment price (i.e. they are
outside the competitive margin), but which become price-setting post-divestment when they are
owned by the competitive fringe. The ﬁgure presented in Appendix A.7 provides an illustration of
the position of the optimal divestment for the case of δ
μ = 1
20.
The following Corollary summarises the main characteristics of the location of the optimal
divestment.
Corollary 1 (Characteristics of the optimal divestment) In the case of intermediate values
of δ, to achieve an optimal divestment the highest cost of the divested capacity needs to be located
between the competitive and the pre-divestment price, that is: ˆ c ∈ (pc,p ∗).
Marginally cheaper divestments than the optimal divestment have a lower pro-competitive eﬀect
(even if they do not include baseload plants, as it is the case in segment III of the post-divestment
price function). This is due to the fact that the price which the dominant ﬁrm would need to accept
to exclude some of the divested capacity from the market is too low. In this case the dominant
ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to set a higher price and accept a larger reduction of its residual demand.
Marginally more expensive divestments than the optimal divestment are also less eﬀective, since
they put less competitive pressure on the dominant ﬁrm (i.e. a lower price reduction is required to
prevent at least some of the divested capacity from producing).
3.3 Implications for the impact of exogenous entry on prices
The price results obtained above also have some implications for the impact of entry by independent
ﬁrms on market prices.8 Assume for simplicity that new capacity of size δ belonging to the compet-
itive fringe can enter the market, with marginal costs ranging from ¯ c to ¯ c − γδ,a l o n gal i n e a rc o s t
function of slope γ. Entry of this type shifts the residual demand function of the dominant ﬁrm in
the same way as a divestment but does not aﬀect its cost curve. Its impact on prices is therefore the












7The former follows from the fact that ˆ c ≥ γ(
μ
3 + δ) (which is shown in Appendix A.1). The latter derives from
the fact that ˆ c>
γμ








6−6 (which is satisﬁed in the case of intermediate divestments).
8This discussion assumes that entry decisions and the cost of new capacity are exogenous.
10same as that obtained with a divestment, as long as the dominant ﬁrm prices on its pre-divestment
cost function (i.e. its costs do not increase relative to the pre-divestment equilibrium). This is the
case in segments III to VI of the post-divestment price function.
Proposition 1 therefore eﬀectively establishes that entry of low-cost (or baseload plants) of
capacity δ leads to a price reduction equal to the one given in segment III, since in this segment of
the post-divestment price function the residual demand faced by the dominant ﬁrm shifts by δ and
the dominant ﬁrm does not price on the ﬂatter part of its residual demand. Entry can therefore
be deﬁned as baseload in our set-up as long as the highest cost of the new capacity entering the
market is strictly below ˆ c. However, entry can also replicate the impact of the optimal divestment
if the highest cost of new capacity of size δ equals exactly ˆ c.9 Proposition 1 therefore indicates that
marginal (or price-setting) entry is more eﬀective than baseload entry in constraining market prices,
assuming the cost of the new capacity is determined by the same cost function as the dominant
ﬁrm.
3.4 Welfare analysis of intermediate divestments
Our assumption of perfectly inelastic demand implies that divestments increase total welfare (or
eﬃciency) if they reduce the total costs of producing the ﬁxed level of output μ. A divestment
aﬀects total costs by leading to three distinct output eﬀects: (i) a reduction in the output of
high-cost capacity owned by the fringe (which takes place as long as the divestment leads to a
reduction in prices); (ii) an increase in output by the divested units (which occurs as long as the
post-divestment price is above the lowest cost of the divested capacity); and (iii) a change in the
net output of the dominant ﬁrm (i.e. output net of any part of the divested capacity which was
being utilised by the dominant ﬁrm in the pre-divestment equilibrium). These three output eﬀects
necessarily sum to 0, given the assumption of inelastic aggregate demand.
Using the case of the optimal divestment to illustrate the impact of these three output eﬀects,




























Note that divestments are welfare-increasing as long as they do not induce the dominant ﬁrm to
9Note of course that entry of capacity with highest cost equal to ˆ c will not be all used in the market for a given
demand level μ.I fd e m a n di sﬁxed at μ t h e r e f o r ei tw i l ln o tb ep r o ﬁtable to build such capacity. If demand is variable
however, then it may be proﬁtable to invest capacity that is price-setting at low or medium demand levels, and that
is infra-marginal during high demand levels.







(μ − δ) and that ˆ q =
ˆ c
γ. The proof of Proposition 1 also
establishes that
μ+ˆ q−δ
4 is the output of the dominant ﬁrm in the case of the optimal divestment.
11reduce its net output (as deﬁned above). This follows from the assumption of increasing marginal
costs, which in turns implies that both the part of the divested capacity that produces in the post-
divestment equilibrium and any net output increase by the dominant ﬁrm have lower marginal costs
than the capacity of the competitive fringe that no longer produces post-divestment.
The following Proposition summarises the welfare eﬀects of divestments of intermediate size.
Proposition 2 (Welfare) Divestments of intermediate size are welfare-increasing for all the ranges

















this range of the costs of the divested units, divestments can reduce welfare for suﬃciently small














Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The result given in Proposition 2 follows from the fact that - for intermediate divestments
- the net output of the dominant ﬁrm falls only in the range of costs which applies to segment
III of the post-divestment price function (as deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n1 ) . F o rt h i sr a n g eo fc o s t s ,
the divestment aﬀects capacity that the dominant ﬁrm was not utilising pre-divestment, and the
dominant ﬁrm reduces its output due to a reduction in its residual demand. As it is shown in
the proof of Proposition 1, the output of the dominant ﬁrm falls by δ
3 in this case. This creates a
productive ineﬃciency which can lead to an overall reduction in total welfare, for suﬃciently small
divestments, as Proposition 2 establishes.
The dominant ﬁrm’s net output increases for intermediate divestments located other than in
the cost range which applies to segment III of the post-divestment price function. As a result, total
production costs are necessarily lower post-divestment in these other cases. Note that Proposition
2 also establishes that the optimal divestment from a consumer welfare perspective always increases
total welfare as well, compared to the pre-divestment outcome.
4 Virtual Power Plants
In this section of the article we describe the impact of ﬁnancial contracts (modelled as VPPs) on
equilibrium prices, in the same model of a dominant ﬁrm facing a competitive fringe considered
above for the case of divestments. VPPs are typically structured as call options that are imposed
on a producer for a certain part of its generation output. The option holders have a right to
acquire electricity from the generator at a strike (or exercise) price ps, and can re-sell this output
in the spot market to obtain the market price p.11 The option will therefore be exercised whenever
p>p s. We assume that both the volumes associated with these options and the strike prices are
set exogenously by a regulator for market power mitigation purposes. In what follows we analyse
the impact of VPPs from a static perspective, and abstract from some of potential institutional
advantages associated with VPPs (as discussed above).
11We assume that multiple players hold the options and do not exercise any market power when exercising their
options.
12For analytical convenience, so as to obtain results which are directly comparable to those derived
above in relation to divestments, we assume that the VPP scheme entails the sale of a group of
inﬁnitesimally small call options each with a diﬀerent strike price.12 T h es u mo ft h ev o l u m e s
associated with the aggregate set of options equals δ. The strike prices associated with each option
are deﬁned along an increasing and continuous linear function that has the same slope (γ)a st h e
marginal cost function of the dominant ﬁrm.13 The VPP scheme that we model is therefore designed
to mimic a physical plant divestment of size δ,f r o maﬁrm with a linear and increasing marginal
cost function with slope γ. As in the case of divestments, the highest strike price associated with
aV P Pc a na l s ob ee x p r e s s e da sc, implying that the lowest strike price is given by c − γδ.T h i s
allows for a direct comparison of the relative impact of a VPP and of a divestment that have the
same position on the cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm, as measured by c.A s w e s h o w b e l o w i n
Proposition 3,t h er e s t r i c t i o no nt h es h a p eo ft h eV P Pd o e sn o ta ﬀe c tt h er e s u l t so nt h en a t u r eo f
the optimal VPP (i.e. the VPP which leads to the largest reduction in spot prices).14
4.1 Prices with VPPs
The following Proposition describes the impact of a VPP on prices, depending on the strike prices
associated with the scheme.
Proposition 3 (Virtual Power Plants) The post-VPP price function depends on the level of
the range of strike prices associated with the VPP (as identiﬁe db yt h el e v e lo ft h eh i g h e s ts t r i k e
price c). This function (pVPP(c)) has 3 segments, for δ ≤
μ
2:
Segment Price Range of c









p∗ − ∆p ≤ c<p ∗ +3 ∆p
IIIVPP p∗ c ≥ p∗ +3 ∆p
,
pVPP(c) is weakly increasing in c. The VPP which achieves the largest price reduction (i.e. the
optimal VPP) is achieved by setting c<p ∗ − ∆p, that is, by choosing a baseload VPP which is
exercised in its entirety.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
12This set-up is similar to that employed by Willems (2006) to describe the impact of VPPs.
13In the case of a VPP that is exercised in its entirety, our set-up implies that the dominant ﬁrm receives ﬁnancial
ﬂows
  q0
q0−δ γxdx from the option holders (where γq
0 equals the highest strike price associated with the VPP), but
foregoes market revenues pδ. If the option is not exercised in its entirety, then the dominant ﬁrm will receive the
following payment from the option holders:
  μ−qd
q0−δ γxdx,w h e r eμ − qd = qf, which determines the market price (i.e.
p = γqf).
14The eﬀectiveness of a VPP is maximised by choosing a set of strike prices that are such that the option is exercised
in its entirety. This result is independent of the slope of the strike price function, and can be also achieved with a
constant strike price.
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Figure 3: Impact of a VPP on prices (and comparison with a divestment of intermediate size), as
a function of the position of the VPP and of the divestment.
The post-VPP price function is shown in Figure 3, as a function of the position of the VPP
c.T h eﬁgure also plots the post-divestment price function p(c) for a divestment of the same size
(assuming intermediate values of δ, as considered in Proposition 1). As the ﬁgure shows the post-
VPP price lies below the residual monopoly price p∗ for c suﬃciently low (i.e. c<p ∗ +3 ∆p), as it
is the case for intermediate divestments.
In segment I of the post-VPP price function, all of the call options associated with the VPP are
exercised, and the VPP has the same impact as a forward contract of size δ. In this case the market
price drops by ∆p, which is the same price reduction achieved by a baseload divestment (as shown
in Proposition 1). The reason why a baseload VPP yields the same price as a baseload divestment
o ft h es a m es i z ei st h a ti te ﬀectively removes an amount δ from the infra-marginal output of the
dominant ﬁrm, inducing it to price lower. This is equivalent to losing some infra-marginal (i.e.
low-cost) output through the divestment of baseload capacity to a competitive fringe, and facing
a reduction in residual demand of the same size. Applying contract cover of size δ is eﬀectively
equivalent to the displacement of both the cost and residual demand functions of the dominant
ﬁrm by an amount δ that is caused by a divestment of baseload generation capacity.
The spot price associated with a baseload VPP applies until this price is higher than the highest
strike price of the VPP, allowing the VPP to be exercised in its entirety. The impact of a baseload
VPP therefore does not depend on the distribution of strike prices, as long as the highest strike
price lies below p∗ − ∆p.
In segment II of the post-VPP price function the highest strike price rises above p∗ − ∆p,
implying that it is not proﬁtable to exercise some of the call options in the VPP. This in turn
14results in a higher amount of output for the dominant ﬁrm beneﬁtting from spot prices (i.e. a
lower level of contract cover), inducing it to set higher level spot prices. The price set in segment
II therefore increases with the level of the highest strike price of the VPP, until none of the options
are exercised in equilibrium (i.e. until the lowest strike price is above the residual monopoly price).
When the latter condition holds, segment III applies and the VPP is ineﬀective (i.e. the post-VPP
spot price is the same as p∗).
4.2 Price comparison between the optimal VPP and the optimal divestment of
intermediate size
Proposition 3 establishes that VPP are never more eﬀective than divestments of the same size and
same position on the cost curve of the dominant ﬁrm, for the intermediate values of δ
μ considered
in Proposition 1. As noted, divestments and VPPs achieve the same price reduction when they are
both baseload.
However, divestments of non-baseload plants can be several-fold more eﬀective in reducing
prices than VPPs. In particular, the optimal divestment can be several-fold more eﬀective than
the optimal VPP (which is in turn equivalent to a baseload divestment, as shown above).
Corollary 2 below compares the price reduction achieved by the optimal divestment to that
obtained by the optimal VPP (the latter being denoted as ∆p ≡
γδ
3 in Proposition 1 and in
Proposition 3).
Corollary 2 For divestments of intermediate size, the ratio between the price reduction achieved





























This function is decreasing in δ











≈ 9.9. At the upper bound of the relevant range of δ
μ (i.e. δ







Corollary 2 shows that selecting the position of the divestment optimally results in a price
reduction that is larger than that achieved with baseload divestment and/or with the optimal
VPP. For relatively small divestments (i.e. at the lower end of the range considered in Proposition
1) the price reduction achieved by the optimal divestment is approximately 10 times larger than
that which a VPP can yield (for a given demand level). At the higher range of the relative size of
the divestment described in Proposition 1, optimal divestments are close to 3-times more eﬀective





function for all divestment sizes is illustrated in the
next Section of the paper.
Given that the price reduction achieved by a VPP is proportional to δ, this means that the
function R( δ
μ) derived in Corollary 2 also describes the size of the VPP required to match an
optimal divestment of size δ, expressed as a ratio of μ.T h a ti s ,i fR( δ
μ)=5(which is the case for
15δ
μ ≈ 1
20), then in order to achieve the same price reduction as an optimal divestment of size δ =
μ
20,
a VPP would need to be 5 times larger, i.e. it would need to equal
μ
4.
The reason for the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness between divestments and VPPs is that
the latter only aﬀect the ﬁnancial ﬂows received by the dominant ﬁrm, but do not aﬀect the
production capacity that is available to competitors of the dominant producer. As we have shown,
divestments can be targeted at strategic plants which are being withheld by the dominant ﬁrm,
and which become price-setting in the post-divestment equilibrium. Divesting these plants can
signiﬁcantly enhance the pro-competitive impact of a divestment.
The same cannot be achieved with a VPP scheme, since VPPs do not directly involve generation
plants and therefore cannot be tailored to apply to speciﬁc types of generation capacity. The eﬀect
of a VPP on a dominant producer is to lead to an outwards shift in its marginal revenue function
(due to the fact that less of its infra-marginal output receives the spot price, so that a price
reduction is less costly for the ﬁrm). This leads to an output increase for the dominant ﬁrm, along
its pre-divestment marginal cost function, and consequently a price reduction. However − unlike a
divestment − the VPP cannot make the residual demand faced by the dominant producer ﬂatter,
nor can it be targeted at plants which the dominant ﬁrm was not utilising in the pre-divestment
equilibrium.
A further implication of the comparison between divestments and VPPs is that mimicking the
properties of the optimal divestment by setting a range for the strike prices in the VPP that is
equal to the cost range of the optimal divestment does not increase the pro-competitive impact of
a VPP (relative to a baseload VPP). In particular, for intermediate divestments it can be shown
that ˆ c<p ∗ −∆p, which implies that a VPP that is designed to mimic the optimal divestment (i.e.
with a maximum strike price equal to ˆ c) is actually equivalent to a baseload VPP that is always
exercised, and is therefore signiﬁcantly less eﬀective than the optimal divestment.
The reason for this result is that with a VPP the dominant ﬁrm receives the strike price rather
than the spot price for part of its sales. In situations where the VPP’s strike prices span the
equilibrium price that can be achieved with the optimal divestment, the dominant ﬁrm does not
face incentives to reduce the spot price below ˆ c (which in turn is below p∗−∆p) in order to decrease
the number of options which are exercised. Doing this would be sub-optimal, since the dominant
ﬁrm would forego higher revenues from the option holders in exchange for lower revenues from the
spot market (with no additional increase in its sales relative to the pre-divestment equilibrium).
In the case of divestments, lowering the spot price to a level below ˆ c is instead optimal for the
dominant ﬁrm, since it reduces the output that is produced by the divested assets, allowing it to
increase its sales.





function by 2 also measures the relative impact of optimal
price-setting entry and baseload entry, as described in Section 3.3. This is because baseload entry
yields a price reduction that is twice as large as the one obtained with a baseload divestment.
164.3 Welfare comparison between the optimal VPP and the optimal divestment
of intermediate size
The discussion of the welfare eﬀects of divestments presented in Section 3.4 implies that the optimal
VPP is welfare-increasing. This follows from the fact that it induces the dominant ﬁrm to increase
its net output, thus leading to a reduction in the output of high-cost capacity belonging to the
competitive fringe. However, the optimal divestment always leads to a greater eﬃciency increase
than the optimal VPP. This result is stated formally in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Optimal divestments of intermediate size increase total welfare by more than the
optimal VPP (and/or a baseload divestment) of the same size.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
This Proposition therefore shows that divestments, if chosen optimally, can increase both con-
sumer and total welfare by more than VPPs. The intuition for the welfare result is that at the
optimal divestment more of the production of the competitive fringe shifts from high cost capacity
to lower cost capacity (i.e. that which is divested), coupled with the fact that the dominant ﬁrm
also increases its net output (for δ
μ < 1 − 2 √
6). This eﬃcient reallocation of output takes place to
a greater extent than with a VPP, since the latter yields a lower reduction in prices.
5 Prices with small and large divestments
This section of the article extends some of the results presented in Section 3 to cases with smaller
and larger divestments than those considered in Proposition 1. We show that the core result shown
above (i.e. the fact that an optimally chosen divestment can be signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in
reducing prices than a baseload divestment and/or a VPP) extends to the cases of small and large
divestments. The optimal divestment becomes as eﬀective as a baseload divestment or a VPP of the
same size only when the divestment is so large that it achieves the competitive price independently
of its position on the cost curve of the dominant producer. For this to be the case, the divested
capacity needs to equal the competitive output level of the dominant producer, which is equivalent
to 50% of total demand (i.e.
μ
2). This would clearly represent a very large divestment which is not
realistic for practical purposes.
The following Proposition summarises the properties of the optimal divestment, and its re-
lationship to a baseload divestment of the same size, for small divestments (as deﬁn e di nt h e
Proposition).
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17Proof. See Appendix A.5.
This Proposition shows that for small divestments the optimal divestment remains several-
fold more eﬀective than a baseload divestment. As for the case of intermediate divestment, the
optimal divestment has a cost range that is below the pre-divestment price15 and higher than the
competitive price. Contrary to the intermediate case, for small divestments the optimal divestment
is such that the dominant producer faces the incentive to set a price equal to the lowest cost of
the divested capacity (i.e. p =¯ c − γδ), which is equivalent to pricing on segment V of the post-
divestment price function plotted in Figure 2. This means that the none of the divested units
produce in the post-divestment equilibrium (even though they can still be considered price-setting
since the cheapest divested unit sets the price). This also means that the dominant producer never
prices on the ﬂatter segment of its residual demand curve in this case. The output of the dominant
ﬁrm increases in the case of the optimal divestment of small size, implying that the divestment is
welfare-increasing.
The following Proposition summarises the properties of the optimal divestment, and its rela-
tionship to a baseload divestment, for large divestments (as deﬁned in the Proposition).
Proposition 6 (Large divestments) For the case where δ
μ ∈ (1 − 2 √
6, 1




achieves the optimal divestment (even though the optimal divestment is not unique). The optimal
divestment always yields the competitive price pc =
γμ
2 , whilst a baseload divestment yields a price
of p∗ − ∆p >p c for δ
μ < 1
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in δ








Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Proposition 6 shows that the optimal divestment for suﬃciently large divestment always achieves
the competitive price, thereby maximising both consumer and total welfare. The divested units in
this case are price-setting post-divestment, and their marginal costs encompass the post-divestment
price (as in the case of intermediate divestments). The optimal divestment can be achieved by




, which is equivalent to divesting the lowest-cost capacity of aggregate size
δ that is withheld by the dominant ﬁrm in the pre-divestment equilibrium (whilst for the cases
of small and intermediate divestments relatively more expensive capacity needs to be divested).
Contrary to the other cases, the optimal divestment is not unique for large divestments. Also
in this case, baseload divestments are always less eﬀective than optimally-chosen large divestment,
unless the size of the divestment is very large (i.e. it equals half of total demand, which is equivalent
to the competitive output of the dominant producer).
Using the Propositions for small, intermediate and large divestments respectively, we can con-
struct the function describing the ratio of the price impact of the optimal divestment and of a
baseload divestment (or a baseload VPP of the same size) for all values of δ between 0 and
μ
2.
15This follows from the fact that γ
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Figure 4: Ratio between the reduction in prices achieved by the optimal divestment and a base-
load divestment (or a baseload VPP); and the post-divestment price at the optimal divestment
(normalised by γμ).
This is shown in Figure 4. This function decreases monotonically with δ
μ and converges to 1 as
the divestment becomes very large. Figure 4 also shows the post-divestment price associated with
the optimal divestment for each value of δ
μ (normalised by γμ).16 This function also decreases




μ ≥ 1 − 2 √
6 ≈ 0.18.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied the impact of remedy design in a model where a dominant producer faces a
competitive fringe with the same cost structure. We analysed the eﬀect on market prices of transfers
of capacity from a dominant producer to a competitive fringe. We show that divesting capacity
that is marginal (or price-setting) in the post-divestment equilibrium can be several fold more
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19eﬀective in reducing prices that an equivalent release of baseload capacity. In order to maximise
the eﬀectiveness of the divestment from a consumer welfare perspective, the divested capacity
needs to include assets which are suﬃciently competitive to impose a competitive constraint on the
dominant ﬁrm but whose costs are not too low so as to induce the dominant producer to accept
a larger loss in its output and keep prices high. In the optimal post-divestment equilibrium (for
intermediate and large divestments), the cost range of the divested capacity needs to span the post-
divestment price (implying that some but not all of the divested capacity produces in equilibrium).
The optimal divestment from the perspective of consumer welfare is always eﬃciency-increasing in
our set-up.
We have also compared the eﬀectiveness of divestments to that of VPP schemes. We established
that the eﬀectiveness of VPPs is maximised when all of the options which are sold are exercised.
This is achieved by setting a suﬃciently low exercise price. In this case, the VPP reduces prices as
much as a divestment of baseload generation of the same size. Given that the optimal divestment
is several-fold more eﬀective than a baseload divestment, our ﬁndings also imply that divestments
can be signiﬁcantly more pro-competitive than VPPs (if the divested plants are selected optimally).
Whilst VPPs may be preferred to a divestment because of other reasons (e.g. ease of implementa-
tion, and reversibility), our results show that relying on VPPs as a remedy rather than divestment
can lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in the eﬀectiveness of the intervention from a market power
mitigation perspective.
Our ﬁndings have a direct policy relevance, given that divestments and VPPs are frequently
accepted by competition authorities as remedies in antitrust cases relating to the electricity sector.
Our results are also relevant to the evaluation of merger eﬀects in power generation markets, since
divestments are the exact opposite of a merger. The ﬁndings of this paper imply that a merger where
a portfolio generator buys price-setting capacity from a smaller competitor can have signiﬁcantly
greater eﬀect on prices than one where additional baseload capacity is purchased instead. This
can be interpreted as meaning that the competitive constraint exercised by price-setting capacity
is much greater than that imposed by baseload generation. By the same token, our results indicate
that the price-increasing eﬀect of the acquisition of a given volume of baseload generation by a ﬁrm
with market power can be remedied by signiﬁcantly smaller divestments of price-setting capacity.
Finally, our results also imply that the entry of price-setting independent capacity can constrain
prices signiﬁcantly more than the entry of low-cost plants.
Possible extensions of the work presented in this paper include the analysis of cases with variable
demand levels (which is directly relevant to electricity markets), and with oligopoly interaction.
Obtaining analytical results for the case of oligopoly interaction may be a challenge in our set-
up, given the cost discontinuities created by the divestments of generation capacity. We expect
however that the intuitions developed in this paper would also extend to standard oligopoly cases
(e.g. Cournot or Supply Function Equilibria).
Finally, whilst the set-up employed in this paper is developed with the electricity generation
market in mind, our results also extend to other industries with homogenous products and increasing
cost functions (e.g. mining).
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1






6,1 − 2 √
6
i
. The dominant ﬁrm’s post-
divestment marginal cost is deﬁned by the following two-step function:
cd =
(
γqd if qd <q 0 − δ
γ(qd + δ) if qd ≥ q0 − δ
,






γ(μ − qd − δ) if qd <μ− q0 − δ
γ
2(μ + q0 − qd − δ) if μ − q0 − δ ≤ qd ≤ μ − q0 + δ
γ(μ − qd) if qd >μ− q0 + δ
.
As the model is discontinuous we have to study the ﬁrm’s maximization problem in each of
the regions deﬁned by q0 (and δ). The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we will derive the
necessary and feasibility conditions for the equilibrium existence in each of these regions. A unique
candidate equilibrium can exist inside each region since the model is linear. Second, we will study
the existence of proﬁtable deviations at each candidate equilibrium and equilibria at the regions
where the feasibility conditions are not satisﬁed.
Necessary and feasibility conditions for interior equilibria
Case I (baseload divestment): in this region the dominant ﬁrm and the competitive fringe
of ﬁrms produce, respectively, at a higher and lower marginal cost than in the pre-divestment case,







with respect to qI
d and subject to pI = cf, which yields qI
d = q∗
d − 2
3δ,i m p l y i n gt h a tpI = p∗ −
γδ
3 .
The feasibility conditions are qI
d <μ−q0 −δ and qI
d >q 0 −δ,t h u sq0 < 1
3 min{2μ−δ,μ+δ}.S i n c e
δ<
μ
2 this condition reduces to: q0 <
μ+δ
3 .
Case III: the dominant ﬁrm produces at the pre-divestment marginal cost, while the com-
petitive fringe produces at a lower marginal cost, i.e., cd = γqd and cf = γ(μ − qd − δ).T h u s ,









implying that pIII = p∗−
2γδ
3 . The feasibility conditions are qIII
d <μ −q0−δ and qIII
d ≤ q0−δ,w h i c h
for δ<
μ
4 (which is the case for the range of δ that we consider) boil down to:
μ+2δ
3 ≤ q0 <
2(μ−δ)
3 .
Conversely, if δ ≥
μ
4, no equilibrium exists in the region of Case III.
Case IV: the dominant ﬁrm produces at the pre-divestment marginal cost, while the com-
petitive fringe produces at the ﬂatter part of its marginal cost function, i.e., cd = γqd and
cf =
γ
2(μ + q0 − qd − δ).T h u s , pIV =
γ





d )2.F r o m
the ﬁrst-order condition we obtain qIV
d =
μ+q0−δ
4 ,s opIV = 3
8(γ(μ − δ)+c). The feasibility condi-
tion μ − q0 − δ ≤ qIV
d ≤ μ − q0 + δ can be rewritten as (3/5)(μ − δ) ≤ q0 ≤ (3/5)μ + δ,a n dt h e
feasibility condition qIV
d ≤ q0 − δ can be rewritten as q0 ≥ δ + μ/3.
22Notice that 3
5(μ − δ) ≥ δ +
μ
3 if δ ≤
μ
6. In such a case the feasibility conditions boil down to:
3




6, the feasibility conditions reduce to: δ +
μ
3 ≤ q0 ≤ 3
5μ + δ.
Case VI: the dominant ﬁrm and the competitive fringe of ﬁrms produce at the pre-divestment
marginal cost, i.e., ci = γqi for i = d,f.T h u s ,t h eﬁrst-order condition yields the same result as in
the pre-divestment case: qVI
d = q∗
d and pVI = p∗. Here, the feasibility conditions are qVI
d >μ−q0+δ
or, equivalently, q0 > 2
3μ + δ,a n dqVI
d ≤ q0 − δ,o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,q0 ≥
μ
3 + δ. Thus, we have that:
q0 > 2
3μ + δ.
Infeasible cases or sub-optimal cases
Case i: cd = γ(qd + δ) and cf =
γ
2(μ + q0 − qd − δ).T h e ﬁrst-order condition yields qd =
1
4(μ+q0−3δ). The feasibility condition μ−q0−δ ≤ qd ≤ μ−q0+δ implies that
3μ−δ
5 ≤ q0 ≤
3μ+7δ
5 ,
while the feasibility condition qd >q 0 − δ implies that q0 <
μ+δ




5 ,t h et w o
conditions reduce to
3μ−δ






5 holds only if δ>
μ
2.
Case ii: cd = γ(qd + δ) and cf = γ(μ − qd).F r o mt h eﬁrst-order condition we have qd =
μ−δ
3 .
The condition qd >μ−q0 +δ can be rewritten as q0 > 2
3(μ+2δ),w h i l eqd >q 0 −δ can be rewritten
as q0 <
μ+2δ
3 . Therefore, we have that 2
3(μ +2 δ) <q 0 <
μ+2δ
3 , which is a contradiction.
Case iii: the post-divestment marginal cost curve passes through the second jump of the
marginal revenue curve. If so, the higher value of the marginal revenue function at qd = μ−q0+δ,i . e . ,
γ
2(μ+q0−δ)−γ(μ−q0+δ), must be higher than the corresponding marginal cost: γ(μ−q0+δ+δ).T h i s
requires that q0 >
3μ+7δ
5 . Also, the lower value of the marginal revenue function at qd = μ−q0 +δ,
i.e., γ(μ − 2(μ − q0 + δ)), must be lower than marginal cost: γ(μ − q0 + δ + δ). This requires that
2μ+4δ
3 >q 0.T h u s ,
3μ+7δ
5 <q 0 < 2
3(μ +2 δ), which holds since δ<μ . In addition, we need that
q0 − δ<μ− q0 + δ,i . e .q0 <
μ




5 holds, which is a contradiction.
Case iv: the third segment of the marginal revenue curve passes through the jump of the
marginal cost curve. This requires that γ((q0 − δ)+δ) >γ (μ − 2(q0 − δ)),i . e . ,q0 >
μ+2δ
3 ,a n dt h a t
γ(μ−2(q0 −δ)) >γ (q0 −δ),i . e .q0 <
μ
3 +δ. Both conditions can be rewritten as
μ+2δ
3 <q 0 <
μ
3 +δ.








Case v:T h eﬂat part of the marginal revenue curve passes through the jump of the marginal cost
curve. If so, the ﬂat part of the marginal revenue curve at qd = q0−δ,i . e . ,
γ
2(μ+q0−δ)−γ(q0−δ),m u s t
be lower than the post-divestment marginal cost: γ (qd + δ)=γq0. This requires that q0 >
μ+δ
3 .
Also, the marginal revenue curve at qd = q0 − δ must be higher than the pre-divestment marginal
cost: γ(q0−δ). This requires that q0 <
μ
3 +δ. In addition, we need that μ−q0+δ<q 0−δ<μ −q0+δ,
or, equivalently,
μ
2 <q 0 <
μ













2 <q 0 ≤
μ
3 + δ provided that δ<
μ




2 i fa n do n l yi f
δ>
μ
6. N o t ea l s ot h a tf o rδ<
μ
5 (which holds in this Proposition), the range of q0 where case v





3 (μ − δ) >δ+
μ
3).
As we show below, for δ ≤
³
1 − 2 √
6
´
μ then Case III yields a greater level for proﬁts for the







(μ − δ). The condition δ ≤
³










































































































(μ − δ) >
μ
3 + δ implying that for
μ
2 <q 0 <
μ
3 + δ Case III is always more
proﬁtable than Case IV. Given that case v is a constrained version of Case IV (since revenues are
determined on the same segment of the residual demand curve, but total costs are constrained to
b es e tb yt h ep o s i t i o no ft h ej u m pi nt h em a r g i n a lcost function, and cannot be optimally set along
the pre-divestment cost function as in case IV), this implies that Case III also yields larger proﬁts
than case v, which cannot be an equilibrium.
Proﬁtable deviations and equilibria
Based on the conditions set out above, the following equilibrium cases can be identiﬁed (these
are illustrated in Figure 5 in this proof):
Case I: q0 <
μ+δ
3 . Here, the candidate equilibrium, qI
d, is the unique equilibrium. The marginal
revenue is higher than the marginal cost for qd <q I
d, so decreasing the output is no proﬁtable.
Conversely, the marginal cost is always higher than the marginal revenue for any qd >q I
d:t h e
marginal revenue curve, which is decreasing in qd, jumps up at μ − q0 − δ, however it does not
intersect with the marginal cost curve provided that δ<
μ
2 (see infeasible Case i). Finally, the
marginal revenue curve jumps down at μ − q0 + δ.
Case II:
μ+δ
3 ≤ q0 <
μ+2δ
3 . Here, Cases I, III, IV and VI are not feasible. Notice that
q0−δ<μ−q0−δ ⇔ q0 <
μ






4. Therefore, if δ<
μ
4 holds and q0 is inside
of the region of Case II,w eh a v et h a tt h eﬁrst step of the marginal revenue curve passes through
the jump of the marginal cost curve. The dominant ﬁrm does not have incentive to produce more
than q0 − δ (the marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue for any qd >q 0 − δ since Case
i is not feasible), and it does not have incentive to produce less than q0 − δ (the marginal cost is
lower than the marginal revenue). Thus, in this region the dominant ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to set
qII
d = q0 − δ.F r o mp = cf = γ(μ − qd − δ),w eh a v et h a tpII = γ(μ − q0).
Case III:
μ+2δ
3 ≤ q0 < 2
3(μ − δ), and Case IV: 3
5(μ − δ) ≤ q0 ≤ 3





3 ≤ q0 ≤ 3
5μ + δ (if δ>
μ
6). Notice that 3
5(μ − δ) < 2
3(μ − δ), i.e., the regions always overlap
24for δ ≤
μ
6.M o r e o v e r ,f o rδ<
μ
5 the regions also overlap (since δ +
μ
3 < 2
3(μ−δ)). We can therefore





3 <q 0 < 3
5(μ − δ),o n l yC a s eIII occurs, implying that qIII
d is the unique
equilibrium: the marginal revenue is higher than the marginal cost for any qd <q III
d ,w h i l et h e
marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue for any qd >q III
d :a tqd = μ−q0−δ the marginal
revenue curve jumps up, but it does not intersect with the pre-divestment marginal cost (this would
require that q0 ≥ 3
5(μ − δ)), and it does not with the post-divestment marginal cost curve either
since δ<
μ





3 <q 0 <δ+
μ
3,o n l yC a s eIII occurs and represents the unique equilibrium
(see above).
* If the previous conditions on q0 do not hold and q0 < min{2
3(μ − δ), 3
5μ + δ}, then the Cases
III and IV can feasibly occur at the same time. In this case the dominant ﬁrm will choose
the equilibrium with the highest proﬁts, i.e. Case III will represent the equilibrium outcome if
πIII
d >π IV
d ,a n dC a s eIV will represent the equilibrium otherwise. From the expressions given
above note that πIII
d does not depend on the value of q0 whilst πIV
d is increasing in q0 (as we show
formally below). We can therefore identify an indiﬀerence value for q0 (deﬁned as ˆ q) such that, for
q0 < ˆ q we have πIII
d >π IV
d (i.e. Case III represents the equilibrium outcome), and for q0 > ˆ q Case
IV is the equilibrium. ˆ q i sg i v e nb ys e t t i n gπIII
d = πIV
d . From the equilibrium prices and quantities
given above, πIII

























d recall that in Case IV, the equilibrium price can be expressed as pIV
d =
γ
2 (μ − δ + q0 − q). This implies that πIV


























μ − δ + q0¢2 .
The indiﬀerence point ˆ q is therefore given by the following quadratic condition (obtained by










q0¢2 +6( μ − δ)q0 − 5(μ − δ)
2 =0 .














(μ − δ) ≈ 0.63(μ − δ).







(μ − δ). As we discuss in the main text, this identiﬁes the
optimal divestment policy for the range of δ considered in this Proposition. Note that c(ˆ q)=γˆ q is
25below p∗, as should be expected.
Note that for q0 =ˆ q to be consistent with Case IV it needs to be contained within the range of



















: ˆ q ≥
3
5















The two resulting conditions on δ are assumed to hold in this Proposition, and to deﬁne the
range of intermediate divestments.
*I f3
5μ + δ<2
3(μ − δ) (i.e., δ<
μ
25)a n d3
5μ + δ<q 0 < 2
3(μ − δ), then the Cases III and
V (see below) occur at the same time. If this is the case, and if ˆ q<3








μ), then in the Case IV the maximum proﬁti sa c h i e v e da tq0 = 3
5μ + δ (since πIV
d
increases with q0), and πIII
d >π IV
d for q0 < ˆ q.I n t h e C a s e V the maximum proﬁti sa c h i e v e da t
q0 = 2
3μ+δ since πV
d increases with q0 (because higher values of q0 imply higher levels of the residual
demand curve on which the dominant ﬁrm is pricing). Therefore, πV
d (q0) >π V
d (3
5μ + δ) for any
q0 ∈ (3
5μ + δ, 2




5μ + δ) >π III
d =
γ
6(μ − δ)2 .T h u s ,f o rv a l u e s
of q0 higher than 3
5μ+δ,t h eC a s eV deﬁnes the equilibrium outcome rather than Case III (which
is also feasible).
*I f3
5μ + δ ≥ 2
3(μ − δ) (i.e., δ ≥
μ
25)a n d2
3(μ − δ) <q 0 < 3
5μ + δ, then only Case IV occurs,
implying that qIV
d is the unique equilibrium: the marginal revenue is higher than the marginal cost
for any qd <q IV
d , while the marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue for any qd >q IV
d .
Case V : the pre-divestment marginal cost curve passes through the second jump of the marginal
revenue curve. If so, the ﬂat part of the marginal revenue curve at qd = μ−q0+δ, i.e.,
γ
2(μ+q0−δ)−
γ(μ−q0 +δ), must be higher than the marginal cost: γ(μ−q0 +δ). This requires that q0 > 3
5μ+δ.
Also, the third step of the marginal revenue curve at qd = μ−q0+δ,i . e . ,γ(μ−2(μ−q0 +δ)),m u s t
be lower than the marginal cost: γ(μ−q0 +δ). This requires that 2
3μ+δ>q 0. Therefore, we have
that 3
5μ+δ<q 0 < 2
3μ+δ. The dominant ﬁrm will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce more/less than
q0 − δ,t h u sqV
d = μ − q0 + δ.F r o mp = cf = γ(μ − qd),w eh a v et h a tpV = γ(q0 − δ)=c − γδ.
Case VI: q0 > 2
3μ+δ, here, qVI
d is the unique equilibrium: the marginal revenue is higher than
the marginal cost for any qd <q VI
d , while the marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue for
any qd >q VI
d . Recall that it is not feasible that the third step of the marginal revenue curve passes
through the jump of the marginal cost curve (see infeasible Case iv).
Optimal divestment
Notice that the minimum pII is achieved at q0 =
μ+2δ
3 ,w h e r epII = p∗ − 2
3γδ.T h e r e f o r e ,f o r
ag i v e nδ,w eh a v et h a tpIII =m i n pII <p II <p I = p∗ − ∆p <p VI = p∗. The minimum pV
is achieved at q0 = 3
5μ + δ,w h e r epV = 3
5γμ. The price corresponding to Case IV equals the
minimum pV for q0 = 3
5μ + δ, and takes a lower value for q0 < 3
5μ + δ (since it is decreasing in q0).
26Note also that the price set by the dominant ﬁrm at the indiﬀerence point between Cases III and
IV is necessarily lower in Case IV than in Case III since when the ﬁrm deviates to Case IV it
prices on the ﬂattest part of its residual demand curve, and it stops pricing on the segment of the
residual demand curve obtained when the fringe produces at lower cost. In order to do so it must
expand output. Since pIII =m i n pII <p II <p I,a n dpIV and pV are increasing in c,i tf o l l o w s















A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As it is established in Section 3.4, a suﬃcient condition for divestments to be welfare-increasing is
that the output of the dominant ﬁrm (net of the divested capacity) does not decrease. For this to
be the case, the marginal cost of the dominant ﬁrm in the post-divestment equilibrium must be






γqd if qd <q 0 − δ
γ(qd + δ) if qd ≥ q0 − δ
.
Note that in Cases I and II of the post-divestment equilibrium, we have that qd ≥ q0 − δ.A
suﬃcient condition for divestments to increase welfare in those two cases is therefore that qd ≥
μ
3−δ.




3δ,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes this condition.
• We also have that qII
d = q0 −δ. The minimum output in Case II is therefore given when q0 is
minimised within the range of Case II.T h i si ss of o rq0 =
μ+δ





which also satisﬁes the condition.
For other cases, we require qd ≥
μ
3 for welfare to increase. Taking the remaining four cases in
turn:




3, which does not satisfy the condition.





4 . Output is increasing in q0, and is therefore








(μ − δ), which is the location of the optimal divestment. Solving for
the corresponding output level yields qIV
d =
μ−δ √
6 , which is decreasing in δ. Solving for the
maximum feasible δ in the range of intermediate divestment (i.e. δ =1− 2 √




3,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the condition for welfare to increase.
• In Case V ,w eh a v et h a tqV
d = μ−q0+δ, which is decreasing in q0. The maximum q0 yields the




which satisﬁes the condition.
27• The condition is trivially satisﬁed in Case VI, where the divestment has no impact on market
outcomes.
The only case where divestments can lead to a reduction in welfare is therefore Case III.I n






















, which is decreasing in q0. Substi-







(μ − δ)),y i e l d s











which is within the range of δ







6−7 − and q0 high enough − divestments can reduce welfare.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Case I (the option is always exercised)




q0−δ γxdx − pδ where p = γ(μ − qd).
Simplifying, we obtain






(−δ2 +2 q0δ) − pδ.
The ﬁrst-order derivative yields qd =
μ+δ





. The feasibility conditions
are that p>γ q 0 and q0 ≥ δ. The former implies: q0 <
2μ−δ
3 ⇒ c<p ∗ −
γδ
3 . To satisfy the second
condition we require δ ≤
μ
2.
Case II (only part of the option is exercised)




q0−δ γxdx− p(μ − qd + δ − q0),where we
have used that qf = p/γ = μ − qd. Simplifying,
πd = γ(μ − qd)(2qd + q0 − μ − δ)+
γ
2
(μ2 +2 q0δ − 2μqd − q0 − δ2).















to be an equilibrium the following two feasibility conditions must hold i) qd > 0,o rq0 < 2μ+δ; ii)







which is stricter than condition i. The equivalent condition for c is: p∗ −
γδ
3 < c<p ∗ + γδ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The welfare impact of a baseload VPP (which we deﬁne as ∆WB)i st h es a m ea st h eo n eo fa
baseload divestment. It is given by the reduction in costs faced by the competitive fringe due to















9 (μ − δ).









6 . These results imply that the welfare impact of the optimal divestment (which we deﬁne
as ∆ ˆ W) is given by the following expression:











































































































































∆ ˆ W − ∆WB
´¶
,
29with 5(0,0) = 0.T h eH e s s i a nm a t r i xo f∆ ˆ W − ∆WB is





























which is positive deﬁnite. Hence, μ = δ =0is a global minimum, where ∆ ˆ W −∆WB =0 . For any
positive μ>0 and δ>0,w et h u sh a v et h a t∆ ˆ W − ∆WB > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
From the proof of Proposition 1 we have that for δ
μ ∈ (0,1 − 12
5
√
6) the cases i, ii, iii, iv and v are
not feasible (case v requires that δ>μ / 6), whereas Cases I, II, III, IV, V and VI are feasible
depending on the location of q0. Using the proof of Proposition 1,w eh a v et h a t ,f o rag i v e nq0,
• if q0 <
μ+δ
3 ,t h e nqI
d is the unique equilibrium.
• if
μ+δ
3 ≤ q0 <
μ+2δ
3 ,t h e nqII
d is the unique equilibrium.
• if
μ+2δ
3 ≤ q0 < 3
5(μ − δ),t h e nqIII
d is the unique equilibrium.
• if 3
5(μ − δ) ≤ q0 ≤ 3
5μ + δ,t h e nC a s e sIII and IV overlap. From above, however, we have
that ˆ q,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yπIII
d = πIV
d , is not contained in the range of q0 that deﬁnes Case
IV.A sc a s ei is not feasible, here qIII
d is the unique equilibrium.
• if 3
5μ + δ<q 0 < 2
3(μ − δ),t h e nC a s e sIII and V overlap (since δ<μ / 25). In this case the
dominant ﬁrm will choose the equilibrium that yields the highest proﬁt. Thus, Case III is
the equilibrium outcome if πIII
d >π V




6(μ − δ)2,w h e r e a sπV
d is increasing in q0:
πV
d = γ(q0 − δ)(μ − q0 + δ) −
γ
2
(μ − q0 + δ)2.
Let ˆ q0 be a value for q0 so that πIII
d = πV
d ,t h e nf o rq0 < ˆ q0 we have πIII
d >π V
d ,a n df o rq0 > ˆ q0
we have πV
d >π III
d , provided that 3
5μ + δ<ˆ q0 < 2
3(μ − δ). ˆ q0 is thus given by
γ(μ − q0 + δ)
∙
(q0 − δ) −







w h i c hc a nb er e w r i t t e na s
−3q02 +2 ( 3 δ +2 μ)q0 −
2
3
(2μ2 +5 δ2 +5 δμ)=0 .
This yields two positive roots in q0, but only one of them is contained in the region where
30Case V is feasible:17
q0 =ˆ q0 ≡
2
3





This root is contained in the region where Cases III and V overlap. This follows from the
fact that πV
d >π III
d at q0 = 2
3(μ−δ),a n dπIII
d >π V
d at q0 = 3
5μ+δ.S i n c eπIII
d is constant and
πV
d is increasing in q0,w eh a v et h a t3
5μ+δ<ˆ q0 < 2
3(μ−δ). The price is given by p = γ(q0−δ),






3(μ − δ) <q 0 < 2
3μ + δ, then only Case V applies, qV
d is then the unique equilibrium.
• if q0 > 2
3μ + δ,t h e nqVI
d is the unique equilibrium.
Notice that the minimum pII is achieved at q0 =
μ+2δ
3 ,w h e r epII = p∗ − 2
3γδ,a n dt h a tt h e
minimum price achieved when Case V is the only case which applies (deﬁned as minpV ) obtains
at q0 = 2
3(μ − δ),w h e r epV = p∗ − 5
3γδ. Therefore, for a given δ, the minimum prices that can be
achieved in each region satisfy minpV < minpII = pIII <p I = p∗ − 1
3γδ < pVI = p∗. In the region
where Cases III and V overlap, q0 is lower than the lower bound of the region where only Case
V exists and, moreover, pV and πV
d increase with q0,t h u sp(γˆ q0) < minpV . Therefore, the optimal










A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
From the proof of Proposition 1 we have that for δ
μ ∈ (1 − 2 √
6, 1
2] the Cases i, ii, iii and iv are not
feasible, whereas Cases v, I, II, III, IV, V and VIare feasible. The range where Case v applies is
μ
2 <q 0 <
μ
3 +δ. As it is shown in the proof of Proposition 1, the output of the dominant ﬁrm in Case




μ + q0 − δ − qd¢
.
This in turn implies that pv =
γμ
2 ≡ pc. This means that if for a given q0 Case v is the equilibrium
outcome, q0 also represents the optimal position of the divestment (though not necessarily unique),
since it delivers the competitive price pc.
Using the proof of Proposition 1,w eh a v et h a t ,f o rag i v e nq0,
• if δ ≥
μ
5, then only the Case v exists, so pv is the unique equilibrium, for q0 ∈
¡2







5,t h e nC a s e sIII and v overlap for
μ
2 <q 0 ≤
μ
3 + δ.
These conditions imply that if πv
d >π III
d at q0 =
μ
3 + δ, then setting q0 =
μ
3 + δ achieves
the optimal divestment. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, πIII
d =
γ
6 (μ − δ)
2 .U s i n g t h e



















μ − q0 + δ
¢
.
17The second root is above the upper bound of the feasible region, i.e.,
2














































γδ − c )










6 (μ − δ)
2 , which is equivalent to 2
3μ2 > (μ − δ)
2.
In the range of δ considered here (i.e. for δ
μ ∈ (1 − 2 √
6, 1
2] )this condition is satisﬁed, since the
right hand side of the inequality is decreasing in δ, and it equals 2
3μ2 for δ =
³
1 − 2 √
6
´
μ.T h i s
proves that setting q0 =
μ
3 +δ achieves the optimal divestment in the range of δ
μ considered in this
Proposition. For all other values of δ contained within the range consid e r e di nt h i sP r o p o s i t i o n( i . e .
for δ>
³
1 − 2 √
6
´
μ), there exists a lower value for q0 so that the equilibrium price is the competitive







dq0 = pc − γ(q0 − δ),
which implies that for a slight increase in δ, there exists a slight decrease in q0 so that πV
d keeps
constant. By contrast, for a slight increase in δ, πIII
d decreases. Therefore, for a higher δ,t h e r e
exist multiple values for q0 for which pc is the equilibrium outcome (since πV
d >π III
d ).
A.7 Illustration of the position of the optimal divestment (for δ =
μ
20)
Figure 6 illustrates the position of the optimal divestment, relative to the pre-divestment marginal
cost and residual demand functions of the dominant ﬁrm, for the case of δ =
μ
20.A st h eﬁgure shows
the cost range of the optimal divestment is between the pre-divestment price and the competitive
price. As it is explained in the main text, for divestments of intermediate size it is always the case
that ˆ c ∈ (pc,p ∗).
32